And therefore it is said that it [i.e., predestination] is foreknowledge and preparation". 3 Like his teacher, Thomas does not take 1 Tim. 2:4 to mean that every human being will be saved; quite to the contrary, after quoting this text, he states matter-of-factly that not all are saved according to divine predestination, which includes God's will to prepare only certain individuals for salvation. at the opening article of q. 6, which again asks "whether predestination pertains to knowledge or will," where Thomas further distinguishes between providence and predestination vis-à-vis
God's will. Providence and predestination, he explains, differ in two ways. First, providence is the universally applicable name for ordering to an end, and so it extends to all things that God orders to some end, whether they are rational or irrational, good or evil. Predestination, by contrast, looks only to that end which is primary for the rational creature, namely, glory; and so it pertains only to humans, and more specifically to those humans who "tend toward" or "seek"
(spectant) salvation. 6 Second, providence and predestination differ in light of another distinction, which obtains wherever there is ordination to an end, namely, that between the order 4 or ordering itself (ipsum ordinem) and the conclusion or result of the order (exitum vel eventum ordinis). Providence concerns only the order itself toward an end; hence, by His providence God orders all humans to beatitude. But predestination pertains also to the conclusion or result of the order; hence, it concerns only those who actually attain to glory. Thomas's distinction between providence concerning humans and predestination corresponds, then, to that between God's antecedent and consequent will. Thomas makes clear that those who are predestined and thus reach their beatific end do so "not principally by their own powers, but by the help of grace divinely given".
7
It is here that divine election and God's unequal love of humans enters the equation. On the other hand, Thomas notes in the sed contras that God's love is the cause of election and God wills a greater good for the person who is predestined, so God must love the elect sinner more. 18 In order to answer the question, Thomas distinguishes between the eternal and the temporal and between God's love and the object of that love. Whereas "presently" (ut nunc) God loves the just person who is damned more than the predestined sinner (as the objections indicate), the question ought to be determined based more on the love of God, which is eternal and immutable, than on the temporal object loved. And, because from eternity God has willed a greater good for the one who is predestined, it must be affirmed "simply"
(simpliciter) that God loves the predestined sinner more than the damned just person.
19
If we return to the Scriptum on Bk. I, we find that Thomas asks directly in q. 1 a. 1 of d. as applying to God's consequent will for all humans who will, in fact, be saved. The second way is to affirm that "all" in the sacred text signifies not every individual human but every nation, race, or kind, "because He has predestined to life some belonging to every condition of humankind," Thomas observes. 28 In reply to the fourth objection, that God wills that every human should be saved because He has created the human to attain to the end of eternal salvation, Thomas intimates that God's consequent will for the salvation of only certain humans takes into account the other circumstances of each person beyond his or her human nature as created. By way of an architectural analogy, he explains:
A wise craftsman does not will that his work should reach its end unless according to the
plan of the end (secundum rationem finis). For if there is some disposition [in the work]
that is incompatible with the form which he intends to produce, he does not produce that form in it, unless perhaps that indisposition is removed. Just as a builder does not will to bring together stones to form the structure of a house if they remain unhewn, so too it is with God.
29
Just as a stone's being unhewn represents a disorder in relation to the ordered structure of the house that the wise builder wills to erect, so too a human's opposing salvation and grace as a means to it disqualifies him for inclusion in the salvific edifice built by divine predestination.
This analogy clearly indicates how an indisposition in the object willed can be a reason for the object's rejection, though not a cause of willing on the part of the one who wills. The builder wills, for whatever reason, to build an ordered house; it is only in light of a particular stone's being unfit to contribute to that order that it is rejected.
Thomas continues and develops this line of thought in the second article of his sixth disputed question on truth, which asks "whether [God's] foreknowledge of merits is a cause of or reason for predestination". 30 At the heart of the second objection is 1 Tim. 2:4 interpreted according to the antecedent/consequent will distinction. It seems that divine foreknowledge of merits is a cause of predestination, the argument runs, because predestination necessarily includes both God's antecedent and consequent will, the latter of which is "determined by us, insofar as we direct ourselves in various ways to meriting salvation or damnation". 31 The objection explicitly points out that if the divine will for human salvation included only the antecedent will, according to which God wills that all should be saved, as 1 Tim. 2:4 says, then it would follow that all would be predestined. But Thomas has made clear in his opening article that not all are predestined, of course.
Thomas answers the question with great conceptual precision based on several nested distinctions. The first and most important of these is that between eternal predestination itself and its twofold temporal effect, namely, grace and glory. merit cannot be a cause of grace, of course, since grace is the principle of good action oriented toward salvation and so merit itself is the effect of cooperating grace. 32 Although "a certain natural disposition" (dispositio naturalis quaedam) prepares the human for receiving and making use of grace, "it does not follow from this," Thomas maintains, "that our actions, whether preceding or following grace, are a cause of predestination itself". 33 On the cause of predestination itself, Thomas engages in a detailed discussion of the various ways that a certain will can be moved: either according to the mode of debt or duty (i.e., what one is obligated to do), or according to the mode of merit (i.e., what one deserves). According to the mode of duty, a will is moved either absolutely (i.e., according to the ultimate end itself, which is the object of the will) or from something presupposed (i.e., when something requires some necessity in order to be the particular thing willed). An example of one willing absolutely according to the mode of duty is a human who wills to be happy; no human is able not to will his own happiness, which is his duty or destiny qua human. Thomas's example of one who wills from something presupposed according to the mode of duty is a generous king who wishes to make a certain man a knight; because being a knight presupposes having a horse, the king is obliged to give a horse to the one whom he wills to knight. 34 An instance of this kind of cause of willing in the case of God is His creation of a human being: because being a human presupposes having reason, when God's willing things that proceed from His pure generosity alone is nothing other than "the superabundant love of the one willing toward the end, after which the perfection of goodness itself strives. Hence the cause of predestination is nothing other than the goodness of God
Himself."
37
In this light, Thomas replies to the second objection by conceding that predestination does, in fact, include God's consequent will, which in some way considers our part as humans.
35 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117 
